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6In Plato’s Meno, Socrates engages in dialogue with Meno, a man who 
questions whether virtue can be taught. Throughout the dialogue, 
Socrates and Meno grapple with the definition of virtue, whether it 
can be taught, how to distinguish between knowledge and true opin-
ion, and finally the ramifications of this distinction regarding their 
previous questions. They finally agree that virtue is the ability to guide 
“rightly,” or in a manner that is both good and useful; they also agree 
that it can be taught only if virtue comes from knowledge, and can-
not be taught if it comes from true opinion. They define true opinion 
as correctly believing something to be right without understanding 
it, and knowledge as knowing something to be right due to a deeper 
understanding of it. 
Near the very end of the dialogue, Socrates illustrates a point to Meno 
using the statues of Daedalus as an example.  In Greek mythology, 
Daedalus was a brilliant architect and sculptor who built the famous 
Labyrinth of Crete, and whose statues seemed so real that they could 
run away if not chained.  Socrates said to Meno:
It isn’t worth a great deal to own one of [Daedalus’s] creations if it’s loose; 
like a runaway, it will not stay. But it is worth quite a great deal when 
bound, for his works are very beautiful. What am I getting at? This bears on 
true opinions. For in fact, true opinions, as long as they stay, are beautiful 
possessions and accomplish all that is good, but they are unwilling to stay 
very long. They run away from the soul of a man, so that they are not worth 
much until someone binds them by reflection on the reason for them. And 
that, my friend Meno, is recollection, as we agreed before. When bound, 
they in the first place become knowledge; and secondly, they abide. That is 
why knowledge is more to be valued than right opinion:  Knowledge differs 
from right opinion by its bond. (31)
This brief passage encapsulates all of Socrates’ argument and reveals 
through an apparent contradiction that Socrates may have meant rea-
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7son when he said recollection; both the encapsulation and revelation 
have implications for other parts of the dialogue.
The unchained statues of Daedalus represent Socrates’s definition of 
true opinion. While the statue may be beautiful, it isn’t worth a great 
deal because it isn’t bound to its owner and could disappear. This 
corresponds to true opinion, which, although worthy to possess and 
virtuous in its practice, is impermanent. As a teacher cannot pass on 
what he does not truly know and understand, true opinion cannot be 
taught. Conversely, the chained statues of Daedalus represent Socra-
tes’s definition of knowledge. The statue is both beautiful and valuable 
because it has been secured to its owner. This corresponds to knowl-
edge, which is just true opinion that is bound to the soul of a man by 
reflection on why it is true. Knowledge is therefore permanent and, as 
a teacher can pass on what he does truly know and understand, it can 
be taught.
The definition of true opinion as represented by the unchained statues 
of Daedalus sheds light on Socrates’s brief conversation with Any-
tus, a prominent politician and military leader, during the dialogue. 
Socrates asks why some of the sons of the most virtuous and powerful 
men of Athens turned out to be quite unlike their fathers, spoiled and 
ignoble. Socrates uses this example to show Anytus that virtue cannot 
be taught; however, like the statues of Daedalus, we can conclude in-
stead that the virtue of these statesmen was temporary and unchained 
to reality—virtue of true opinion—and so they could not pass it on 
to their sons because they themselves did not truly understand it.
The definition of knowledge as represented by the chained statues 
of Daedalus also shows what Socrates may think about reason. The 
chain that binds true opinion to the soul of a man, Socrates says, is 
recollection. However, he also defines this chain as “reflection on the 
reason” for true opinions (31). Here, he appears to be contradicting 
himself. Socrates tells Meno that true opinion becomes knowledge 
through recollection—remembering things that have already been 
learned in a past life—and also that true opinions become knowledge 
through reflection on the reason for them.
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8Examining this contradiction in light of the Daedalus statues analogy 
reveals that Socrates is probably talking not about recollection but in-
stead about reason. Socrates tells Meno that he has “heard from men 
and women who are wise in things divine” that “the soul is immortal, 
and has been born many times, and has beheld all things in this world 
and the world beyond, there is nothing it has not learnt” (12-13). 
According to Socrates, these religious figures taught him the belief 
of recollection, and the main tenet of this belief is that all humans 
already know all knowledge through their past lives; therefore, what 
we call learning is actually just recalling something that we knew in 
a past life. However, later in the dialogue, Socrates classifies both 
religious figures and poets as those who have true opinion, as opposed 
to knowledge. It therefore seems that Socrates must not regard their 
teachings as knowledge, since they could only be telling him their 
opinions that are unchained to reality. Why would Socrates tell Meno 
something that he thinks is likely false? There must be some point he 
was trying to make. If we replace what Socrates calls “recollection” 
with reason, then the contradiction is solved: reason is the same thing 
as “reflection” on why things are the way they are, and Socrates’s state-
ments to Meno are now consistent and have no contradictions.
If we assume that Socrates meant reason when he said recollection—
as he may have—it makes more sense of his “demonstration” with the 
slave boy, another participant in the dialogue. Socrates commands 
Meno to “pay close attention” to “whether it appears to you that 
[he] recollects, or learns from me” (12). Socrates then walks the boy 
through basic geometric principles in regard to the area of a square. 
He never outright tells the boy an answer to a question, but instead 
guides the boy using other questions. Socrates says that the boy is 
recollecting these things, but his guidance makes it clear that the boy 
is using his reason instead of recollection to discern what is true and 
what is false. 
Although replacing reason with recollection in this example makes 
more sense, a question still remains: why would Socrates call it rec-
ollection if he meant reason? One possible answer is that he wanted 
to teach Meno but did not think Meno would be mentally capable 
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of truly understanding how reason would be the chain to tether true 
opinion to oneself. If we assume this is true, then Socrates simply 
wanted to instill a true opinion in Meno. Socrates must realize that 
Meno will only believe this for a time, and it’s interesting to note that 
Socrates still encourages Meno to “persuade your host Anytus here of 
the things of which you yourself are now persuaded” (33). Socrates 
knows that Meno only possesses true opinion on this matter and so 
will therefore be unable to teach Anytus any of what the dialogue was 
about, but still Socrates encourages him to try to do so. 
The statues of Daedalus analogy also helps to explain why Socrates 
suddenly focuses on people who are “divine” (33) at the very end of 
the dialogue. He calls “soothsayers and seers, and the whole race of 
poets” as well as the politicians “divine and inspired” (33). Just before 
he deems them so, however, he says that they are divine because 
“without possessing intelligence they bring a multitude of important 
things to successful issue in what they do and say” (33). Socrates is 
therefore saying that, without possessing knowledge, all of these men 
are virtuous; as he only lays out two ways to be virtuous, he must 
then mean that holding true opinion and being regarded as divinely 
blessed are the same. 
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